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First stage: contract choice of the principal 
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Second stage: effort choice of the agents 
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Winner-takes-all treatment (Tournament) 
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Benefit of the Principal 
T+'#$!2-7A!7$#%7?#+7*8!F#!%**>?#!7A%7!7A#!2#+#/)7!-/!7A#!.$)+6).%&!/$-?!#//-$7*!-/!%B#+7*!)*!
&)+#%$@!3A#$#/-$#8!7A#!.$)+6).%&b*!.%4-//!)*!*>6A!7A%7J!
! ȫ஺ ൌͷ Ͳ൅݁ ஻ ൅݁ ஼ െʹ ݉ ௞ െܯ ݇אሼ݂ǡݑሽ! _V` 
3A#!.$)+6).%&!$#6#)C#*!%+!#+'-F?#+7!-/!K9!.-)+7*!.&>*!7A#!*>?!-/!%B#+7*b!#//-$7!&#C#&*!)+!A)*!
B$->.!?)+>*!7A#!F%B#*!A#!.%4*!7-!%B#+7*8!'#.#+')+B!-+!A)*!6-+7$%67!6A-)6#@!3A#!.$)+6).%&b*!




Table 1:!Earning functions of the participants in the different contracts and treatments!
Winner-takes-all treatment _3->$+%?#+7` 
  Fair Contract  Unfair Contract 
3A#!.$)+6).%&!_P`!! ͷͲ ൅ ݁஻ ൅݁ ஼ െʹכͳ ͹െͳ ͸ ! ͷͲ ൅ ݁஻ ൅݁ ஼ െʹכͳ ͵െͳ ͸ !
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Elicitation of risk aversion 










3A#! #D.#$)?#+7! F%*! 6-?.>7#$)H#'! F)7A! 7A#! *-/7F%$#! iHX3$##j! _Y)*6A2%6A#$8! ;99U`@! 3A#!
$#6$>)7?#+7! F%*! 6-+'>67#'! F)7A! 7A#! *-/7F%$#! i5Q1((j! _"$#)+#$8! ;99V`@! 1>2f#67*! F#$#!

















3.  Predictions 
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4.  Results 
G+!->$!#?.)$)6%&!%+%&4*)*!F#!&--,!%7!/)$*7!%7!7A#!2#A%C)-$!-/!7A#!%B#+7*8!)+!.%$7)6>&%$!7A#!#//-$7!




4.1. Effort level 
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Figure 1: Evolution of average effort by contract and treatment!
!

























Table 3: Tobit estimations of effort provision across contracts and treatments 
M#.#+'%+7!C%$)%2&#J!(//-$7!&#C#&!
G+'#.#+'#+7!
\%$)%2&#*! M#*6$).7)-+! =-'#&!_]`! =-'#&!_;`! =-'#&!_N`!





















Interaction  Unfair ! Winner-takes-all  X@];]!_@c:]`! X@;;V!_@UN9`! X@;N9!_@Uc]`!
Contractt-1  O-+7$%67! 6A-)6#! -/! 7A#! .$)+6).%&! )+! 7A#!
.$#C)->*!.#$)-'J!]!n!>+/%)$L!9!n!/%)$!
!X @ K 9 U ! _ @ K ; K ` ! X @ K < 9 ! _ @ V : U ` !
Effortt-1  52*#$C#'! #//-$7! -/! 7A#! .%$7+#$! )+! 7A#!
.$#C)->*!.#$)-'!_9!o!;9`!




Efftreatt-1 E f f o r t - 1   ! Winner-takes-all  !X @ ; V V 0 0 ! _ @ ] ; N ` ! X @ ] : N 0 0 ! _ @ 9 : < ` !
Efffairt-1 E f f o r t - 1   ! Unfair  !@ 9 U N ! _ @ 9 K ] ` ! @ 9 K K ! _ @ 9 V ; ` !
Contractt-2  O-+7$%67! 6A-)6#! -/! 7A#! .$)+6).%&! 7F-!
.#$)-'*!#%$&)#$J!]!n!>+/%)$L!9!n!/%)$ 
!! X @ U K ; ! _ @ K c 9 ` !
Effortt-2  52*#$C#'! #//-$7! -/! 7A#! .%$7+#$! 7F-!
.#$)-'*!#%$&)#$!_9!o!;9` 
!! @ N ] : 0 0 0 !
_@9K]`!
Efftreatt-2 E f f o r t - 2   ! Winner-takes-all  !! X @ ] 9 < ! _ @ 9 c U ` 0 !
Efffairt-2 E f f o r t - 2   ! Unfair  !! @ 9 N K ! _ @ 9 V ; ` !
stablechoice  Choice-1 = Choice-2  !! X @ : ; V ! _ @ K 9 V ` !
riskpref  p! -/! *%/#! 6A-)6#*! )+! 7%*,! ]! )+! 7A#!
#D.#$)?#+7!
X@;N9!_@]UN`! X@]K<!_@]N:`! X@]Vc!_@]NK`!






52*#$C%7)-+*! ! ;U;9! ;K:V! ;VV:!
Z#/7X6#+*-$#'! ! ;<:! ;<;! ;<9!
Q)BA7X6#+*-$#'! ! N;! N9! ;<!
g$-2!q!Y! ! @999! @999! @999!
































*>BB#*7)+B! 7A%7! 7A#! #//#67! -/! $)*,! %C#$*)-+! )*! +-7! ?-$#! *)B+)/)6%+7! )+! -+#! 7$#%7?#+7! 7A%+! )+! 7A#! -7A#$! -+#@!
=-$#-C#$8!F#!$%+!*#.%$%7#'!$#B$#**)-+*!/-$!7A#!F)++#$X7%,#*X%&&!%+'!7A#!F)++#$X7%,#*X?-$#!7$#%7?#+7*!%+'!7A#!
#//#67!-/!$)*,!%C#$*)-+!)*!+-7!*)B+)/)6%+7!)+!2-7A!6%*#*@!! ]:
4.2. Heterogeneity of agents 
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4.3. Principal’s behavior and profits 






Figure 3: Share of the fair contracts in each of the 20 periods 
!































g$)+6).%&*! Y%)$!6-+7$%67! ]<@]K! ]K@cc!
! T+/%)$!6-+7$%67! ;V@U<! ;]@;;!
PB#+7*! Y%)$!6-+7$%67! ]<@9<! ;9@cV!





/$-?! %! A)BA#$! #//-$7! .$-C)*)-+! 24! 7A#! %B#+7*@! PB#+7*! %$#! 2#77#$! -//! )+! 7A#! /%)$! 6-+7$%67@!
=-$#-C#$8!F#!-2*#$C#!7A%78!)+!2-7A!6-+7$%67*8!7A#!.$-/)7*!-/!7A#!.$)+6).%&!%$#!%&F%4*!A)BA#$!)+!









EA)7+#4!7#*78!z= 7.879, p<0.0001`@!!! ;N







5.  Conclusion 
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Instructions for Participants in the Winner-takes-More-Treatment 




This experiment has two parts. These are the instructions for the second part. Depending on 
the decisions of you and the other participants in this experiment, you may receive additional 
payments.  
Therefore  we  recommend  to  study  these  instructions  in  detail.  If  you  have  any  question, 
please contact us before the experiment starts. All participants receive the same instructions. 
You must not talk with other participants during the experiment.  Otherwise  you  are 
excluded from the experiment and receive no payments at all. 
During the experiment we talk about points instead of Euros. At first, all your revenues are 
calculated in points. We exchange the final score into Euros at the end of the experiment. The 
exchange rate is 
1 Point = 70 Eurocents. 
At the end of this experiment, you receive payments for all your received points in both parts 
of the experiment and the 4 Euros for participation in cash. 
Now we explain the procedure of the experiment on the following pages in detail. Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
(In Italics: differences in the winner-takes-all-treatment) 
 
 
Part 2 of the Experiment 
 
1.  Design of the experiment 
In this part of the experiment you and two other persons form a group. Each group contains a 
participant A, a participant B and a participant C. The assignment to the groups is random and 
anonymous, You will see on the screen if you are a participant A, B or C. 
 
This part of the experiment continues for 20 periods. During all periods you remain in the 
same group and in the same role (A, B, or C). In each period you make a decision which can 
influence your payoff. At the end of the experiment, the computer chooses randomly one 
period.  We  will  pay  you  for  this  randomly  selected  period.  All  other  periods  are  payoff 
irrelevant. 
 
Each period is divided into two phases: 
1.  Participant A chooses between two payments, 1 or 2, for participants B and C. In 
return, A receives contributions of B and C which are conditioned for each payment. 
At the end of the period, B and C will learn which payment has been chosen by A. 
2.  Now, participants B and C make their decisions for each possible payment. 
  At first, B and C choose simultaneously a contribution in case that A has opted 
for payment 1. 
  Then B and C choose simultaneously a contribution in case that A has opted 
for payment 2. 
At the end of the experiment the choice of A and the relevant contributions of B and C are 
revealed to all participants. 
 
Now,  we  will  explain  the  relationship  between p a y m e n t ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
earnings at the end of the period in detail. 
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2.  The decision of participant A 
Participant A has an endowment of 50 points and chooses between payments 1 and 2. 
x  Payment 1: 
  B and C receive 13 points each 
  16 additional points will be distributed between B and C. 16 additional points 
will be given either to B or C. The other participant does not receive any 
additional points.  
  Participants B and C increase their share in these 16 points by increasing their 
contribution to A. If, for example, B contributes more than C she will also earn 
more  points.  Note  that  a  higher  contribution  also  implies  higher  costs. 
Participants B and C increase their probability of getting these 16 points by 
increasing their contribution to A. If, for example, B contributes more than C 
she is more likely to get these points. Note that a higher contribution also 
implies higher costs. 
 
x  Payment 2: 
  B and C receive 13 points each. 
  24  additional  points  will  be  distributed  between  B  and  C.  Out  of  these  24 
points each participant receives at least 4 points. 24 additional points will be 
given to B and C. One participant receives 20 additional points, the other 
participant receives 4 additional points.  
  Participants B and C increase their share in these 24 points by increasing their 
contribution to A. If, for example, C contributes more than B she will also earn 
more  points.  Note  that  a  higher  contribution  also  implies  higher  costs. 
Participants B and C increase their probability of getting 16 points more by 
increasing their contribution to A. If, for example, B contributes more than C 
she is more likely to get these points. Note that a higher contribution also 
implies higher costs. 
 
The costs of a contribution and the sharing rules for (probabilities of receiving) the 16 points 
are identical for both payments (see below). When making her decision, participant A will see 
the following screen. Participant A chooses between payments 1 and 2 by typing the relevant 
number in the field. The decision is irreversible once A has clicked the OK button. Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  




3.  The decisions of participants B and C 
In phase 2, participants B and C make two decisions each. These decisions differ only with 
respect  to  the  subsequent  payments.  Otherwise  the  following  explanation  hold  for  both 
decisions in the same way. In the end earnings and costs will be realized only for the payment 
chosen by participant A.  
x  Participants  B  und  C  choose  an  individual  contribution  between  0  and  20  (only 
integers are possible).  
x  These contributions are transferred to participant A. 
x  A contribution implies a cost which has to be borne by the contributing participant. 
For example, a contribution of 8 points costs 3.20 points. A contribution of 12 points 
costs  7.20  points.  Table  1  provides  an  overview  over  the  contribution  and  their 
associated costs. Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
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Table 1: The costs of contribution to A for the contributing participant (B or C) 
Contribution  Cost  Contribution Cost 
0  0.00  10  5.00 
1  0.05  11  6.05 
2  0.20  12  7.20 
3  0.45  13  8.45 
4  0.80  14  9.80 
5  1.25  15  11.25 
6  1.80  16  12.80 
7  2.45  17  14.45 
8  3.20  18  16.20 
9  4.05  19  18.05 
    20  20.00 
 
x  Via a higher contribution, a participant can increase her share in the 16 points. Via a 
higher  contribution,  a  participant  can  increase  her  probability  of  getting  the  16 
points. Table 2 shows the shares. 
Example 1: Participant C contributes 5 points more than participant B (In table 2: 
Contribution B – Contribution C = -5).In this case, B’s share is 23.63%. The share of 
C is 76.37% or 12.22 points. In this case, B’s probability is 23.63%. The probability of 
C is 76.37%. 
Example 1: Participant B contributes 3 points more than participant C (In table 2: 
Contribution B – Contribution C = -5).In this case, B’s share is 66.99% or 10.72 
points.  The  share  of  C  is  33.01%  or  5.28  points.  In  this  case,  B’s  probability  is 
66.99%. The probability of C is 33.01%. 
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Table 2: The difference in contributions between participants B and C and the resulting share 
of the distributed 16 points. 
Table 2: The difference in contributions between participants B and C and the resulting 




Share of the 16 points 





Share of the 16 points 
















-16 and less  0.00%  100.00%  0  50.00%  50.00% 
-15  0.20%  99.80%  1  56.05%  43.95% 
-14  0.78%  99.22%  2  61.72%  38.28% 
-13  1.76%  98.24%  3  66.99%  33.01% 
-12  3.13%  96.88%  4  71.88%  28.13% 
-11  4.88%  95.12%  5  76.37%  23.63% 
-10  7.03%  92.97%  6  80.47%  19.53% 
-9  9.57%  90.43%  7  84.18%  15.82% 
-8  12.50%  87.50%  8  87.50%  12.50% 
-7  15.82%  84.18%  9  90.43%  9.57% 
-6  19.53%  80.47%  10  92.97%  7.03% 
-5  23.63%  76.37%  11  95.12%  4.88% 
-4  28.13%  71.88%  12  96.88%  3.13% 
-3  33.01%  66.99%  13  98.24%  1.76% 
-2  38.28%  61.72%  14  99.22%  0.78% 
-1  43.95%  56.05%  15  99.80%  0.20% 
     1 6   a n d   m o r e   1 0 0 . 0 0 %   0 . 0 0 %  
 
x  On the computer screen the decision situation looks like this for B and C. At first, each 
participant decides about a contribution for payment 1. On the next screen each of Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
(In Italics: differences in the winner-takes-all-treatment) 
 
them  decides  about  a  contribution  for  payment  2.  B  and  C  make  each  decision 
simultaneously. 
The following screenshot shows the decision situation of B and C for payment 2. On top to 
the left, you will find the field in which you state your contribution. To the right, you see how 
much a contribution costs. The lower half of the screen shows the shares of the 16 points (the 
probabilities of getting 16 points), depending on how much the contributions differ between 
the two participants. 
 
 
4.  The determination of revenues and costs for each participant. 
This experiment has 20 periods. Only one randomly chosen period will be paid. In this period 
the following aspects are relevant for the final payments, 
  The payment chosen by participant A (1 or 2) 
  The contributions of B and C for this payment. 
  The costs of these contributions. 
The contributions for the payment which has not been selected are irrelevant. 
 
Costs and revenues of participant A: Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
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Participant A has an endowment of 50 points at the beginning of the period. Additionally she 
receives the contributions of B and C. Participant A has to make the assigned payments to B 
and C.  
 
Costs and revenues of participant B and C: 
Participants B and C each receive a payment from A. In payment 1, 16 points are distributed 
between  B  and  C.  In  payment  2,  24  points  are  distributed  between  B  and  C,  but  each 
participant receives at least 4 of these 24 points. The size of the additional payment depends 
on the difference in the contributions. The costs of the contribution are withdrawn from these 
revenues. 
Participants B and C each receive a payment from A.In payment 1, either B or C get 16 
points.  In  payment  2,  one  participant  gets  24  points  and  the  other  gets  4  points.  The 
probability of getting the higher payment depends on the difference in the contributions. The 
costs of the contribution are withdrawn from these revenues. 
 
 
Example 3 for a random period: 
Participant  A  selects  payment  1.  Participant  B  chooses  a  contribution  of  11  points  for 
payment 1 and 9 points for payment 2. Participant C chooses a contribution of 10 points for 
payment 1 and 13 points for payment 2. The contributions for payment 2 are irrelevant. 
In payment 1, B contributes 1 point more than C. Her share is therefore 56.05% (8.97 points). 
The share of C is 43.95% (7.03 points, see Table 2). The resulting revenues for A are: 
In payment 1, B contributes 1 point more than C. Her probability of getting 16 points is 




Endowment  50 points 
Contribution B  11 points 
Contribution C  10 points 
Sum  71 points 
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The costs of A for payment 1 are: 
 
Guaranteed Payment to B  13 points 
Guaranteed Payment to C  13 points 
Additional Payment to B    8,97 points 
16 or 0 points 
Additional Payment to C    7,03 points 
16 or 0 points 
Sum   42 points 
 
Therefore the final profit of participant A is 29 points (71-42). 
 
The revenues for B are: 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Payment (56,05% from 16 points)      8.97 points 
Sum  21.97 points 
 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Payment of 16 points (56,05% probability)    16 points 
Sum  Either 13 points 
or 29 points 
 




Therefore the final profit of participant B is 15.92 points (21.97-6,05) 
Therefore the final profit of participant B is either 6.95 points (13-6.05, with a probability 
of 43.95%) or 22.95 points (29-6.05, with a probability of 56.05%) 
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The revenues for C are: 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Payment (43.95% from 16 points)      7.03 points 
Sum  21,97 points 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Payment of 16 points (43.95% probability)    16 points 
Sum  Either 13 points 
or 29 points 
 
 
The costs of participant B are the costs of her own contribution (10), i.e. 5 points (see table 1) 
 
Therefore the final profit of participant C is 15.03 points (20.03-5) 
Therefore the final profit of participant B is either 8 points (13-5, with a probability of 
56.05%) or 24 points (29-5, with a probability of 43.95%) 
 
 
Example 4 for a random period: 
Participant A selects payment 2. Participant B chooses a contribution of 8 points for payment 
1 and 5 points for payment 2. Participant C chooses a contribution of 7 points for payment 1 
and 7 points for payment 2. The contributions for payment 2 are irrelevant. 
In payment 1, B contributes 2 point less than C. Her share is therefore 38.28% (6.12 points). 
The share of C is 61.72% (9.88 points, see Table 2). The resulting revenues for A are: 
In payment 1, B contributes 2 points less than C. Her probability of getting 16 points is 
therefore 38.28%. The probability of C is 61.72% (see Table 2). The resulting revenues for A 
are: 
 
Endowment  50 points 
Contribution B  5 points 
Contribution C  7 points 
Sum  62 points Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
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The costs of A for payment 2 are: 
 
Guaranteed Payment to B  13 points 
Guaranteed Payment to C  13 points 
Additional Guaranteed Payment to B    4 points 
Additional Guaranteed Payment to C    4 points 
Additional Payment to B    6.12 points 
16 or 0 points 
Additional Payment to C    9.88 points 
16 or 0 points 
Sum  50 points 
 
Therefore the final profit of participant A is 12 points (62-50). 
 
The revenues for B are: 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Guaranteed Payment from A      4 points 
Additional Payment (38.28% from 16 points)      6.12 points 
Sum  23.12 points 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Guaranteed Payment from A      4 points 
Additional Payment of 16 points (38.28% probability)    16 points 




The costs of participant B are the costs of her own contribution (5), i.e. 1.25 points (see table 
1) 
 
Therefore the final profit of participant B is 21.87 points (23.12-1.25) Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
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Therefore the final profit of participant B is either 15.75 points (17-1.25, with a probability 
of 38.28%) or 31.75 points (33-1.25, with a probability of 61.72%) 
 
 
The revenues for C are: 
 
Additional Guaranteed Payment from A      4 points 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Payment (61.72% from 16 points)      9.88 points 
Sum  26,88 points 
 
Guaranteed Payment from A  13 points 
Additional Guaranteed Payment from A      4 points 
Additional Payment of 16 points (61.72% probability)    16 points 




The costs of participant C are the costs of her own contribution (7), i.e. 2.45 points (see table 
1) 
 
Therefore the final profit of participant C is 24.43 points (26.88-2.45) 
Therefore the final profit of participant B is either 14.55 points (17-2.45, with a probability 
of 38.28%) or 30.55 points (33-2.45, with a probability of 61.72%) 
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Please answer the questions carefully and raise your finger if you  have a question or you 
have answered all questions. We use these questions to ensure that all participants understand 
the experiment in the same way.  
 
Question 1: 
Please mark if the following statements are correct or not 
  Ja  Nein 
Participant A chooses the payments for B and C.     
In each period the composition of a group changes.     
If Participant B chooses a higher contribution than C she will always get more 
points from A. 
  
Each participant receives the average of her earnings from all periods.     
The revenues of A increase in the contributions of B and C     
The  payments  of  A  and  B  remain  the  same,  if  B  and  C  both  choose  a 
contribution of 8 points or if both of them choose a contribution of 12. 
  
Participant B chooses a contribution of 12. His costs for this contribution are 
7.33 points. 
  
Participant B chooses a contribution of 11, C a contribution of 19. The share 
of B from the 16 points is 12.50%. 
In the winner takes all treatment: B’s probability of winning the 16 points is 
12.50% 
  
The experiment has 20 periods     
 Instructions for Winner-Takes more-Treatment  
(In Italics: differences in the winner-takes-all-treatment) 
 
Question 2: 
Participant B chooses a contribution of 8 points for payment 1 and a contribution of 8 points 
for  payment  2.  Participant  C  chooses  a  contribution  of  14  points  for  payment  1  and  a 
contribution of 14 points for payment 2.  
Determine B’s share from the 16 points. In the winner takes all treatment: Determine B’s 




Determine the costs for B and C (see table 1)  
 
Determine the final profit for all three participants, 




x  If A has chosen payment 2. 
 
Aufgabe 3: 
Participant B chooses a contribution of 10 points for payment 1 and a contribution of 4 points 
for  payment  2.  Participant  C  chooses  a  contribution  of  6  points  for  payment  1  and  a 
contribution of 8 points for payment 2.  
Determine C’s share from the 16 points for payment 1 (Table 2).  




Determine B’s share from the 16 points for payment 2 (Table 2).  




Participant A has chosen payment 1. Determine the final profit for all three participants. Learning and Peer Effects
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